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LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF THE GREAT LAKES
Noah D. Hall and Benjamin C. Houston*
INTRODUCTION
The Great Lakes are vast.  The five lakes that make up the sys-
tem—Superior, Michigan, Huron, Erie, and Ontario—comprise the
largest freshwater system on Earth and contain approximately one-
fifth of the world’s water supply.1  The Great Lakes provide water for
consumption, highways for trade and transportation, fuel for power,
and natural beauty for recreation.2  Approximately 35 million people
live within the Great Lakes Basin, and 23 million depend on the Lakes
for their drinking water.3  The Lakes are more than 750 miles wide
and have a surface area greater than 300,000 square miles; there are
25,000 square miles of connected smaller lakes, hundreds of miles of
navigable rivers, and 10,000 miles of shoreline.4  Simply put, the Great
Lakes are enormous in their physical size and quantity of water.
The enormity of the Great Lakes is matched by a governance and
legal regime that can overwhelm attorneys and policymakers.  The
system is shared and governed by two countries, eight states,5 two
provinces, and numerous Indian tribes and First Nations, in addition
to a multitude of American, Canadian, and international agencies, as
well as thousands of local governments.6  This “patchwork” of Great
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1. MARK SPROULE-JONES, RESTORATION OF THE GREAT LAKES: PROMISES, PRACTICES, PER-
FORMANCES 3 (2002).
2. GOV’T OF CAN. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE GREAT LAKES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL
ATLAS AND RESOURCE BOOK, at 3 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter CAN. & EPA, GREAT LAKES AT-
LAS], available at http://epa.gov/greatlakes/atlas/glat-ch1.html.
3. LEE BOTTS & PAUL MULDOON, EVOLUTION OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY
AGREEMENT 2 (2005); see also SPROULE-JONES, supra note 1, at 2.
4. BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 3, at 1–2.
5. Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Wisconsin.
6. Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the
Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405–06 (2006); Jessica A. Bielecki, Managing Re-
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Lakes governance has achieved mixed success, as the stressors affect-
ing the Lakes have grown more pronounced.7  While the size of the
Great Lakes necessitates some unique governance structures and legal
rules, most of the complexity relates to social challenges, not physical
size.  From a governance perspective, there is no single “Great Lakes
system,” nor a discreet “Great Lakes population.”  Instead, there are
many overlapping environmental and natural resources within the
Great Lakes system and similarly overlapping populations concerned
with specific resources and functions.
For example, when managing lake levels to support navigation and
shipping, the Great Lakes must be considered in the entirety of their
natural and human-altered watershed, and the concerned population
includes tens of millions of residents and businesses in both the
United States and Canada.  Thus, governance of an issue like system-
wide lake levels should be (and is) addressed at an appropriately large
international scale.  However, when managing water withdrawals
from an inland trout stream within the Great Lakes watershed, local
concerns and interests should play a significant role, and perhaps the
relatively local interests warrant smaller scale governance.  The de-
bate over the scale of governance in the Great Lakes comes with some
ideological baggage, as advocates bring their own preferences for
large central government as opposed to local control. International
governance of a large transboundary system like the Great Lakes has
some logical appeal, but it must be balanced against the interest in
subsidiarity, which “expresses a preference for governance at the most
local level consistent with achieving government’s stated purposes.”8
The debate over the appropriate legal rules for managing and pro-
tecting the Great Lakes is equally complex and loaded with diversity.
There is of course no single human view towards the “environment,”
but rather a wide range of values that vary by individual, time, place,
and the environmental decision at issue.  For persons that rely on the
Great Lakes for drinking water, water quality protection is a priority
of the legal regime, and applicable laws should be strengthened.
However, for persons that rely on the Great Lakes to disperse indus-
trial pollution, availability of water for effluent discharge is a priority
and water quality regulatory laws are an economic burden.  To best
sources with Interstate Compacts: A Perspective from the Great Lakes, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 173,
176 (2007).
7. See Nicholas T. Stack, Note, The Great Lakes Compact and an Ohio Constitutional Amend-
ment: Local Protectionisms and Regional Cooperation, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 493, 494
(2010).
8. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Commu-
nity and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339 (1994).
2014] LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF THE GREAT LAKES 725
understand the laws and governance of the Great Lakes, one must be
objective in recognizing the diversity of values, interests, and priorities
at play and acknowledge the fallacy of a single “best” solution for
everyone.
The diversity of values and interests in the Great Lakes creates a
tremendous challenge when using law and governance to address
emerging environmental issues.  The Great Lakes are beset by pollu-
tion from industry, afflicted by eutrophication due to agricultural fer-
tilizers, invaded repeatedly by nonnative species, threatened by
climate change, and eyed by more arid regions for diversions to ease
water shortages in other areas of the country.9  Myriad legal regimes
have arisen to address these challenges within the Great Lakes gov-
ernance structure.
This Article aims to explain the law and governance of the Great
Lakes within the United States. While discussing the key laws and pol-
icies, we do not provide an encyclopedic accounting of all relevant
Great Lakes laws and governance institutions.  Instead, this Article
aims to explain the fundamental structure that establishes and limits
federal, state, and tribal governmental powers.  The structure is rela-
tively permanent; laws and agencies may come and go.  By under-
standing the structure, with all of its strengths and shortcomings, we
can best use the available legal tools to address new and emerging
issues that face the Great Lakes.
We begin in Part II with the federal government and explore the
sources of authority for federal policy making relevant to the Great
Lakes.  Part II begins with federal treaty powers enabling the Bound-
ary Waters Treaty and Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements.  It
then looks at federal regulatory powers over interstate commerce and
navigation, and the exercise of such regulatory power through the
Clean Water Act.  Finally, Part II details the supremacy of federal law
and resulting potential for preemption of state law, such as the federal
ban on states’ Great Lakes oil drilling permits.
Part III examines the extent and limitation of state powers over the
Great Lakes.  It begins with a historical look at the Northwest Ordi-
nance of 1787, which established the rules for statehood in the Great
9. See CAN. & EPA, GREAT LAKES ATLAS, supra note 2, at 29–37, available at http://www.
epa.gov/glnpo/atlas/glat-ch4.html; see also Preparing for Climate Change in the Great Lakes Re-
gion, in CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION: NAVIGATING AN UNCERTAIN FU-
TURE 249–50 (Thomas Dietz & David Bidwell eds., 2012) (noting that there is “ample evidence”
that climate change could have profound direct and indirect impacts on the Great Lakes, includ-
ing changed precipitation patterns, reduced freezing, and greater seasonal weather variability).
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Lakes region.10  The Northwest Ordinance also helped establish the
equal footing of the states subsequently admitted to the Union, which
gave those states title to the beds under the Great Lakes.  Part III
then looks at opportunities for the states to collectively and coopera-
tively govern the shared Great Lakes using interstate compacts with
the consent of Congress.  When cooperation has broken down, the
Supreme Court has provided both the forum and the basic principles
for resolving interstate disputes, developing doctrines of interstate
nuisance and equitable apportionment that can limit states’ uses of
shared natural resources.  Finally, Part III describes an additional limi-
tation on state sovereignty over natural resources when state laws im-
permissibly burden interstate commerce; this doctrine is especially
relevant to state restrictions on the export of water to other states.
Part IV describes the rights and responsibilities of tribal govern-
ments in the management of Great Lakes water and fisheries.  Part V
then looks at private water use rights and the protection of these
property rights as an important part of the governance picture.  The
U.S. Constitution prohibits the taking of property without just com-
pensation, and federal and state government regulation can amount to
a taking if it goes too far.  However, the federal government has a
navigational servitude that insulates it from takings claims when ad-
vancing navigation on the Great Lakes.  Similarly, the states have the
public trust doctrine, which limits a state’s ability to divest itself of
trust resources (such as Great Lakes bottomlands) but also empowers
a state to protect trust resources without being subject to takings
claims.
We offer several disclaimers in our explanation of Great Lakes law
and governance. First, our discussion excludes Canadian domestic law.
This is by no means a knock on the importance of Canadian domestic
law in governing the Great Lakes.  We could summarize the relevant
Canadian domestic law easily enough, but the premise of this Article
is that understanding governance requires far more than a simple in-
ventorying of relevant laws.  To appreciate how Canadian domestic
laws govern the Great Lakes would require a thorough understanding
of Canada’s legal system and unique form of federalism, which differs
in many ways from that of the United States.  Such an effort is well
beyond the scope of this Article.
Second, the ordering of the parts and subparts of this Article is not
intended to put the relevant doctrines, laws, and institutions in order
10. Matthew J. Hegreness, Note, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities, 120 YALE L.J. 1820,
1823 (2011).
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of importance or legal priority.  Instead of beginning with the powers
of the federal government, we could have started with the individual
property rights and tribal sovereignty that predated the United States.
Similarly, we could approach the federalism balance by first looking at
state authority and then viewing the federal government as a limita-
tion on state sovereignty.  While the order does not matter, all of the
parts are essential to having a complete picture of the powers and
authorities for Great Lakes law and governance.
II. FEDERAL POWERS AND SUPREMACY
Our discussion of the law and governance of the Great Lakes begins
with the powers and supremacy of the federal government.  The Con-
stitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,11 provides the system
of federalism and balance of power between the federal government
and the states.  The framers of the Constitution recognized the tension
between empowering a competent federal government (after the
failed Articles of Confederation) and protecting state sovereignty.12
The Constitution thus establishes a federal government of limited
enumerated powers, meaning that the federal government has only
those powers granted to it by the Constitution.13  The enumerated
powers most relevant for Great Lakes governance are the power of
the federal government to enter into treaties and the power of the
federal government to regulate interstate commerce.14
To execute these enumerated powers, Congress relies on the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, which provides that Congress shall have
power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof.”15
The Tenth Amendment, included in the original Bill of Rights, fur-
ther limits the federal government to its enumerated powers.  It pro-
11. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing that the judicial
branch of the federal government is entrusted with interpreting and enforcing the Constitution,
and that the other branches must yield to its decisions).
12. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, at 102–03, 123 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 37, at
233–34 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 86 (James
Madison), NO. 84, at 579–80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 457 (1991); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 636 (1882); Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1874); New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
14. See infra Part II.A–B.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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vides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”16  The Supreme Court has re-
lied, in part, on the Tenth Amendment to support the principle of lim-
ited federal government, while also recognizing that the Amendment
adds little to the Constitutional framework already in place.17
A. Federal Treaty Power
The Constitution provides that the President “shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.”18  Over the past
two centuries, the President has exercised this power to commit the
United States to hundreds of international obligations.  More often,
the President enters into so-called executive agreements, which com-
mit the United States without going through the Article II process
(i.e., Senate approval).19 As detailed above, the treaties entered into
by the President are deemed by the Constitution to be part of the
supreme law of the land.20  Even executive agreements that lack Sen-
ate approval are supreme over state law, according to the Supreme
Court.21  Thus, treaties and executive agreements preempt inconsis-
tent state law and are an important source of federal power.22
The federal government has exercised its treaty power to execute
treaties and agreements that manage and protect the Great Lakes.  It
has done this through both Article II treaties (subject to Senate ap-
proval) and executive agreements.  This Part details the Boundary
Waters Treaty23 and the subsequent Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreements24 that have resulted from the federal treaty power.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Brent v. Bank of Wash., 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 596 (1836); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316.  But see United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (taking the more modest view that the Tenth Amendment merely offers “a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered”).
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
19. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390,
391–92 (1998).
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
21. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942); see also United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
22. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding a migratory bird protection stat-
ute as a valid implementation of a treaty with Great Britain, even if the statute exceeded Con-
gress’s domestic lawmaking powers as understood at that time).
23. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., Jan 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
24. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 301 [hereinaf-
ter 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement]; Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, U.S.-
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Signed in 1909, the Boundary Waters Treaty has been the founda-
tion for transboundary United States and Canadian water manage-
ment for more than a century.25  The Treaty establishes mutual
obligations to protect the shared natural resource of the Great Lakes,
provides for dispute resolution mechanisms, establishes procedures
for investigational capacity and information exchange between the
two countries, and creates an international investigative and adjudica-
tive body called the International Joint Commission (IJC).26
The process that led to the negotiation and signing of the Boundary
Waters Treaty began in 1903, when the United States and Canada es-
tablished the International Waterways Commission to address poten-
tially conflicting rights in the countries’ shared waterways.27  The
International Waterways Commission drafted a proposed treaty that
would govern uses of shared boundary waters and create an interna-
tional body to further advance protection of boundary waters.28  The
proposal, modified through negotiations, eventually led to the Bound-
ary Waters Treaty of 1909.
“Boundary Waters” are defined under the Treaty
as the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers
and connecting waterways, or the portions thereof, along which the
international boundary between the United States and the Domin-
ion of Canada passes, including all bays, arms, and inlets thereof,
but not including tributary waters which in their natural channels
would flow into such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or waters flowing
from such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or the waters of rivers flow-
ing across the boundary.29
While tributary rivers and streams, as well as tributary groundwaters,
are excluded from coverage, the Boundary Waters Treaty governs four
of the five Great Lakes (Lakes Superior, Huron, Erie, and Ontario—
as only Lake Michigan sits entirely within the United States) and hun-
Can., Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1384 [hereinafter 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement];
Protocol Amending the Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, U.S.-Can., Nov. 18, 1987,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,551 [hereinafter 1987 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement] (amending 1978
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra).
25. See Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing International and Domestic
Law, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681, 684, 693–95 (2007).
26. Noah D. Hall, The Centennial of the Boundary Waters Treaty: A Century of United
States–Canadian Transboundary Water Management, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1417, 1418–19 (2008).
27. Jennifer Woodward, Note, International Pollution Control: The United States and Ca-
nada—The International Joint Commission, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325, 326 (1988)
(citing INT’L JOINT COMM’N, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT ON GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY 10
(1978)).
28. Id. at 326–27.
29. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 23, preliminary art., 36 Stat. at 2448–49.
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dreds of other rivers and lakes along the United States–Canada
border.30
The principle concern at the time the Boundary Waters Treaty was
negotiated was navigation and access to boundary waters, not envi-
ronmental management.31  Thus, Article I of the Boundary Waters
Treaty begins:
The High Contracting Parties agree that the navigation of all nav-
igable boundary waters shall forever continue free and open for the
purposes of commerce to the inhabitants and to the ships, vessels,
and boats of both countries equally, subject, however, to any laws
and regulations of either country, within its own territory, not in-
consistent with such privilege of free navigation and applying
equally and without discrimination to the inhabitants, ships, vessels,
and boats of both countries.32
The Boundary Waters Treaty goes far beyond ensuring navigation
and access, and establishes international legal rules for pollution and
use of shared boundary waters.  Article IV provides that the parties
agree “that the waters herein defined as boundary waters and waters
flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the
injury of health or property on the other.”33  Originally, this provision
of the treaty wholly forbade water pollution with transboundary con-
sequences, but after objections from the U.S. Senate and Secretary of
State the language was modified to its current form.34  The United
States’ representatives were opposed to the creation of an interna-
tional body with the authority to police transboundary pollution.35
The United States eventually signed the Treaty only after Canada as-
sured the concerned senators that the pollution provision would only
be enforced in more serious cases.36  Nonetheless, despite the limita-
tions of the Boundary Waters Treaty’s antipollution provision, Article
IV establishes a clear standard for limiting pollution in transboundary
waters—and this principle has had resounding effects over the course
30. See Woodward, supra note 27, at 327 n.14 (“Boundary waters other than the Great Lakes
include the St. Croix River, between Maine and New Brunswick, and the Okanagan, Osoyoos,
and Skagit Rivers, between Washington and British Columbia.”).
31. See id. at 327 (citing F.J.E. Jordan, Great Lakes Pollution: A Framework for Action, 5
OTTAWA L. REV. 65, 67 (1971)); see also Stephen J. Toope & Jutta Brunne´e, Freshwater Regimes:
The Mandate of the International Joint Commission, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 273, 277
(1998).
32. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 23, art. I, 36 Stat. at 2449.
33. Id. art. IV, 36 Stat. at 2450.
34. Hall, supra note 26, at 1421.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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of the last century in defining international environmental law be-
tween the United States and Canada.37
Article III of the Boundary Waters Treaty provides that “no . . .
uses or obstructions or diversions . . . of boundary waters . . . affecting
the natural level or flow of boundary waters . . . shall be made except
by authority of the United States or the Dominion of Canada . . . with
the approval . . . of [the International Joint Commission].”38  In other
words, whenever an actor in either the United States or Canada
wishes to take action that will affect the flow or level of water in the
other country, the matter must be referred to the International Joint
Commission.
The International Joint Commission is a six member investigative
and adjudicative body comprised of three political appointees each
from the United States and Canada.39  While the IJC has been com-
mended for its objectivity and leadership on environmental issues, it is
severely limited in its ultimate adjudicative power.  Article X of the
Boundary Waters Treaty requires a reference from both countries for
a binding arbitral decision, and the consent of the U.S. Senate is re-
quired for such action.40  Thus, if Canada alleges that American indus-
tries and cities are polluting boundary waters to the injury of Canada’s
citizens, both Canada and a two-thirds majority of the U.S. Senate
must agree to submit the matter to the IJC.41  This has never occurred
in the history of the Boundary Waters Treaty.42
While the binding dispute resolution provision has never been in-
voked, the United States and Canada have referred dozens of issues
to the IJC for nonbinding investigative reports and studies pursuant to
Boundary Waters Treaty Article IX,43 which provides:
The High Contracting Parties further agree that any other ques-
tions or matters of difference arising between them involving the
rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or to
the inhabitants of the other, along the common frontier between the
United States and the Dominion of Canada, shall be referred from
time to time to the International Joint Commission for examination
and report, whenever either the Government of the United States
or the Government of the Dominion of Canada shall request that
such questions or matters of difference be so referred.
37. Id.
38. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 23, art. III, 36 Stat. at 2449.
39. See id. art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2451.
40. Id. art. X, 36 Stat. at 2453.
41. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
42. Hall, supra note 26, at 1441.
43. Id. at 1422.
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The International Joint Commission is authorized in each case so
referred to examine into and report upon the facts and circum-
stances of the particular questions and matters referred, together
with such conclusions and recommendations as may be appropriate,
subject, however, to any restrictions or exceptions which may be
imposed with respect thereto by the terms of the reference.
Such reports of the Commission shall not be regarded as deci-
sions of the questions or matters so submitted either on the facts or
the law, and shall in no way have the character of an arbitral
award.44
The Boundary Waters Treaty only requires a reference from one of
the countries to invoke the Article IX process, but as a matter of cus-
tom it has always been done bilaterally with the support of both coun-
tries (consent of the U.S. Senate is not required because the U.S.
Secretary of State has this authority).45  The support of both countries
gives the IJC’s reports and recommendations credibility and helps
provide sufficient funding for its efforts.  With this process, the IJC
has played a valuable role in proactively addressing emerging environ-
mental harms and disputes, and gained respect for its impartial techni-
cal work.46
The Boundary Waters Treaty and its provisions regarding pollution
and the responsibilities of the IJC as international overseer of the
health of the Great Lakes ultimately led to the creation of the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement.47  The Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement “is considered to be a standing reference under the
Boundary Waters Treaty,” expanding on the terms of the original
treaty and updating it for the modern era.48  It is the most relevant
executive agreement for Great Lakes governance.
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement was drafted in response
to a 1964 joint reference to the IJC on pollution in the Great Lakes.49
Concern over pollution in the Great Lakes had also led the IJC to
hold hearings on the issue in 1969 and issue its final report on the
subject in 1970.50  As a result of this report and growing public de-
mand, the United States and Canada formed a joint working group
that would eventually craft the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement.51
44. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 23, art. X, 36 Stat. at 2452.
45. Hall, supra note 26, at 1422.
46. Id.
47. See BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 3, at 13.
48. Id. at 15–16.
49. See id. at 13–14.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id. at 15.
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In 1972, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and U.S. Presi-
dent Richard Nixon signed the first Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement,52 which focused on phosphorous pollution. The purpose
of the original Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement was to create a
special new regime to clean and protect the Great Lakes.53  The 1972
Agreement focused on dealing with eutrophication in the lower Lakes
caused by phosphorous discharges. In addition to this overarching
goal, the 1972 Agreement also set more specific water quality objec-
tives for the new regime, such as regulation of municipal sewage dis-
charges, new requirements for industrial waste, regulations for
discharges from ships, etc.54  Additionally, the 1972 Agreement and
the water quality governance it created aimed to substantially elimi-
nate a number of specific toxins, such as mercury and oil.55
The 1972 Agreement also gave more responsibilities to the IJC.  In
addition to its original duties stemming from the Boundary Waters
Treaty, the IJC became responsible for the analysis and dissemination
of information relating to water quality and the effectiveness of water
quality programs; providing advice to the United States, Canada, and
their state and provincial governments; and reporting annually on the
progress of the Agreement’s water quality goals.56  However, the two
federal governments (specifically the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency and Environment Canada), not the IJC, have primary respon-
sibility for implementing the programs and achieving the objectives of
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.57
In 1978, Canada and the United States expanded the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement (and, by extension, the Boundary Waters
Treaty) yet again.  The purpose of the 1978 iteration of the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement was “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waters of the Great
Lakes Basin Ecosystem,” and it was “the policy of the Parties that . . .
[t]he discharge of toxic substances in toxic amounts be prohibited and
the discharge of any or all persistent toxic substances be virtually
eliminated.”58
52. 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 24; see also BOTTS & MULDOON,
supra note 3, at 15.
53. See id.
54. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Great Lakes, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 50.06
(Amy L. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2011).
55. Id.
56. BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 3, at 17.
57. 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 24, art. V, 23 U.S.T. at 307–08.
58. 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 24, art. II, 30 U.S.T. at 1387.
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In contrast to the 1972 Agreement, the 1978 version sought to im-
prove water quality in the Great Lakes via an ecosystems approach.59
This meant that it was no longer simply the policy of the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement to improve water chemistry through pollu-
tion control, but to restore the ecological integrity of the Great
Lakes.60  Additionally, the “virtual elimination” of toxins in the Great
Lakes similarly expanded the scope of the original Agreement so that
the IJC and the other implementers of Great Lakes water quality pol-
icy could work toward the reduction of the ambient levels of toxic
substances and attempt to reduce the actual use of the substances
through the promotion of pollution prevention and cleaner produc-
tion processes.61
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement continued to evolve
over the decades since the 1979 amendment.  In 1987, in response to
the International Joint Commission Report on Great Lakes Diversions
and Consumptive Use, the parties to the Boundary Waters Treaty and
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement entered into another pro-
tocol to deal with the emerging problems that the Report identified:
excess nutrients, airborne toxic pollutants, accumulated sediments,
and climate change uncertainties.62  The new protocol expanded the
scope of the 1978 Agreement to encompass responses to the newly
identified issues, addressed the problem of nonpoint source pollution,
and laid the foundations for the development of near-shore and open-
water management plans.63  The 1987 amendment thus added to and
reinforced existing provisions.
Canada and the United States expanded the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement yet again in 2012 with another protocol in order to
address a number of new areas of concern, such as increased phos-
phorous loadings, harmful vessel discharges, invasive species, habitat
degradation, and climate change impacts.64
Despite the lofty goals of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agree-
ment, its implementation has been undermined by its status as an ex-
ecutive agreement (lacking U.S. Senate approval) and its failure to
59. See BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 3, at 67.
60. Id. at 67–68.
61. Id. at 68–69.
62. 1987 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 24.
63. See id.
64. Protocol Amending the Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, U.S.-Can., at annex
4–8, Sept. 7, 2012 [hereinafter 2012 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement], available at http://
www.epa.gov/glnpo/glwqa/20120907-Canada-USA_GLWQA_FINAL.pdf.
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contain enforcement provisions.65  The federal courts have refused to
enforce the terms of the Agreement on private parties.66  Despite its
legal shortcomings, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement has
given citizens an increased role in shaping policy to address trans-
boundary pollution in the Great Lakes through increased opportunity
for public participation in decision making.67
B. Federal Regulatory Power
Of the federal government’s enumerated powers, the authority of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce has been most central to
federal environmental lawmaking and natural resource management.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to “regu-
late commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes.”68  The Commerce Clause has been broadly
interpreted by the Supreme Court to reach almost anything that impli-
cates the national economy, including most environmental harms.69
When it comes to water, the Supreme Court has yet to find a limit to
congressional authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause.  From reg-
ulating the fill of wetlands70 to managing public access to artificially
created waterbodies,71 the Supreme Court has sanctioned broad and
expansive federal lawmaking regarding water resources.
The most significant exercise of federal regulatory power relevant
to the Great Lakes was the passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972.72
The Clean Water Act seeks to create a partnership between the states
and the federal government “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”73  To achieve
this lofty goal, the Act creates several regulatory and funding
programs.
65. See Noah D. Hall, The Evolving Role of Citizens in United States–Canadian International
Environmental Law Compliance, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 131, 149 (2007); see also Edith Brown
Weiss, New Directions for the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: A Commentary, 65 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 375, 377 (1989).
66. See, e.g., Lake Erie Alliance for the Prot. of the Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1077 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“Since it does not appear . . . that inadequate
consideration was given to this matter, we find no reason to interfere in the discretionary duties
of the Army Corps of Engineers.”); Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 1001 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (denying the petition “insofar as it challenges the reasonable potential procedures”).
67. See Hall, supra note 65, at 150.
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
69. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
70. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
71. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171–72 (1979).
72. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), Pub. L.
No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006)).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
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Regulation of water pollution under the Clean Water Act begins
with “effluent limitations” promulgated by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency.  These limitations are based on technological stan-
dards that restrict the quantities, rates, and concentrations of pollu-
tants discharged from point sources.74  The effluent limitations are
supplemented by “water quality standards” promulgated by the states
to establish the desired condition of a waterway.75  The water quality
standards are necessary to supplement the technology-based effluent
limitations “to prevent water quality from falling below acceptable
levels.”76  Water quality standards have become more important as a
key regulatory tool to address the cumulative impact of nonpoint
sources, such as agricultural run-off and erosion from timber harvest-
ing, that are not subject to the technology-based effluent limitations.77
These mechanisms are enforced on “point sources” (such as pipes and
sewers) that discharge pollution into navigable waters through Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits.78
The baseline pollution standards that govern permits issued under
the NPDES are exclusively within the purview of the EPA, but states
may choose to implement stricter standards—subject to the approval
of the EPA Administrator—if they so choose.79  Congress delegated
to the EPA the job of permit issuance and administration.80  However,
the Clean Water Act authorizes each state to establish “its own permit
program for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction”
and permitting authority is delegable to the states through the adop-
tion of individual state programs.81  Over the past forty years, the ad-
74. See id. §§ 1311, 1314.
75. Id. § 1313.  However, if the states fail to promulgate adequate water quality standards, the
federal EPA may be forced to fill the void.  Section 303(c)(4)(B) of the Clean Water Act pro-
vides that the Administrator shall propose regulations with “a revised or new water quality stan-
dard for the navigable waters involved . . . in any case where the Administrator determines that a
revised or new standard is necessary to meet the requirements of this chapter.” Id. § 1313(c)(4);
see also Gulf Restoration Network v. Jackson, No. 12-677, 2013 WL 5328547 (E.D. La. Sept. 20,
2013) (holding that the EPA must make a “necessity determination” regarding water quality
standards under the Clean Water Act in response to a petition for rulemaking).
76. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976).
77. See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002).
78. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342, 1362(12).
79. See id. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (“[T]he Administrator shall propose . . . regulations establishing
Federal standards of performance for new sources . . . .”); see also id. § 1370.
80. See id. § 1342(a) (“Except as provided in sections 1328 and 1344 of this title, the Adminis-
trator may, after opportunity for public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant,
or combination of pollutants . . . .”).
81. Id. § 1342(b) (“At any time after the promulgation of the guidelines required by subsec-
tion (i)(2) of section 1314 of this title, the Governor of each State desiring to administer its own
permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction may submit to the
Administrator a full and complete description of the program it proposes to establish and admin-
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ministration of the federal Clean Water Act has thus shifted primarily
to the states.  As of 2013, forty states administer their own NPDES
program for the issuance of permits under the Clean Water Act.82
However, states are still subject to federal oversight, especially with
respect to the administration of their programs and interstate pollu-
tion.  The EPA can refuse to authorize state permit programs that do
not insure that other states with potentially affected waters (such as
the Great Lakes), as well as the public, “receive notice of each appli-
cation for a permit and . . . [an] opportunity for public hearing before
a ruling on each such application.”83  State permit programs must also
“insure that any State . . . whose waters may be affected by the issu-
ance of a permit may submit written recommendations to the permit-
ting State” and to the EPA Administrator.84
In addition to establishing permitting authority, the Clean Water
Act authorizes the EPA to make grants to states, organizations, and
individuals for research, investigations, surveys, and studies.85  The
EPA is also authorized to conduct its own research.86  With respect to
enforcement of NPDES permit conditions, enforcement actions are
generally within the purview of the EPA, but states are responsible for
the enforcement of permits issued under state NPDES programs.87
Also, civil actions may be commenced by citizens for violations of pol-
lutant standards.88
Both civil and criminal penalties may result from enforcement ac-
tions taken by the EPA or the states pursuant to the Clean Water Act.
In the case of civil actions, the EPA “Administrator is authorized to
commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent
or temporary injunction, for any violation for which he is authorized
to issue a compliance order.”89  For criminal violations, there are vary-
ing degrees of penalties based on the mens rea of the violator.  Negli-
gent violations may be punished by fines “of not less than $2,500 nor
ister under State law or under an interstate compact. In addition, such State shall submit a state-
ment from the attorney general (or the attorney for those State water pollution control agencies
which have independent legal counsel), or from the chief legal officer in the case of an interstate
agency, that the laws of such State, or the interstate compact, as the case may be, provide ade-
quate authority to carry out the described program.”).
82. Clean Water Act (CWA), U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/agricul-
ture/lcwa.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3).
84. Id. § 1342(b)(5).
85. Id. § 1254(b)(3).
86. Id. § 1254(b)(1).
87. Id. § 1319(a).
88. Id. § 1365.
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b).
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more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not
more than 1 year, or by both.”90  Knowing violations “shall be pun-
ished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day
of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by
both.”91 Knowing endangerment as a result of violations is punishable
by “a fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment of not more
than 15 years, or both.”92  Subsequent violations may result in more
stringent punishments.93
In addition to the civil and criminal punishments for violations of
water quality standards under the Clean Water Act, downstream
states may also oppose out of state discharges if those discharges are
similarly in violation of applicable permits or standards.94  This regula-
tory prohibition was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Arkansas v.
Oklahoma: “Although these provisions do not authorize the down-
stream State to veto the issuance of a permit for a new point source in
another State, the Administrator retains authority to block the issu-
ance of any state-issued permit that is ‘outside the guidelines and re-
quirements’ of the Act.”95
C. Supremacy of Federal Law
While the federal government is constitutionally limited, when it
acts pursuant to its enumerated powers, its laws and treaties are su-
preme over state laws. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.96
The Supremacy Clause was another response to the failure of the
Articles of Confederation, which gave Congress the power to con-
clude treaties, but without a mechanism for their enforcement.97  The
Supreme Court has long relied on the Supremacy Clause in striking
90. Id. § 1319(c)(1).
91. Id. § 1319(c)(2).
92. Id. § 1319(c)(3)(A).
93. See id. § 1319(b)–(c).
94. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2013) (“No permit may be issued . . . [w]hen the imposition of
conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all af-
fected States . . . .”).
95. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 102 (1992) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)).
96. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
97. See Carlos Manuel Va´squez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 617 (2008).
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down state laws that conflict with federal laws and the objectives of
Congress.98  States possess sovereignty concurrent with the federal
government, but that authority is subject to the limitations imposed on
them by the Supremacy Clause and the laws promulgated by the
Congress.99
Thus, when a state law is challenged, courts may find that federal
law preempts the state law in three different ways.  First, the express
preemption of state law by federal law occurs when Congress has ex-
plicitly acted with intent to displace state law.100  “Congress’ intent to
supplant state authority in a particular field may be express in the
terms of the statute.”101  This category of preemption is often the most
readily identifiable form of preemption.  Express preemption is rare in
environmental law, with the notable exception of nuclear power regu-
lation pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.102  The most nota-
ble example of express preemption in Great Lakes governance is the
congressional ban on Great Lakes drilling enacted in 2005, which pro-
hibited states from issuing permits or leases for new oil and gas drill-
ing in the Great Lakes.103  Prior to the congressional ban (and several
previous temporary moratoria104), oil and gas drilling in the U.S. wa-
ters of the Great Lakes was left to the individual states.105
Second, a court may find implied field preemption absent an ex-
press declaration from Congress that it intends to preempt state law
“if ‘the Act of Congress . . . touch[es] a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to pre-
clude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’”106  Finally,
98. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (Wheat. 9) 1 (1824).
99. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). See generally Bradford R. Clark, The
Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91 (2003).
100. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604–05 (1991).
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2296 (2006); see also N. States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143
(8th Cir. 1971), aff’d mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
103. Section 386 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides that “no federal or state permit or
lease shall be issued for new oil and gas slant, directional, or offshore drilling in or under one or
more of the Great Lakes.”  Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 386, 119 Stat. 594,
744 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15941 (2006)).
104. In 2001, Congress enacted a two-year moratorium on federal and state permits for drill-
ing in the Great Lakes. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-66, § 503, 115 Stat. 486, 512 (2001).  The moratorium was extended in 2003, see Consoli-
dated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 505, 117 Stat. 11, 158, and again in
2005. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 504, 118 Stat. 2809,
2963.
105. See Noah D. Hall, Oil and Freshwater Don’t Mix: Transnational Regulation of Drilling in
the Great Lakes, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 305, 307 (2011).
106. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 605 (alterations in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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“[e]ven when Congress has not chosen to occupy a particular field,
pre-emption may occur to the extent that state and federal law actu-
ally conflict.”107  In other words, if it is impossible to comply with both
the federal and state laws, the federal law will preempt the conflicting
state law.
Consequently, the Supremacy Clause potentially complicates and
impedes state efforts to manage the Great Lakes.  Numerous federal
water quality laws, regulations promulgated by agencies that possess
jurisdiction over the Great Lakes (such as the EPA and the U.S. Coast
Guard), treaties with Canada, and other impositions of federal power
may come at the expense of state lawmaking.  As a practical matter,
the federal government often exercises its powers in ways that en-
courage states to protect and manage the Great Lakes.
III. STATE POWERS AND INTERSTATE GOVERNANCE
Eight states share the Great Lakes, and thus state sovereignty and
interstate governance have been central in shaping modern Great
Lakes law and policy.  The story of the Great Lakes states begins with
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, one of the most important achieve-
ments of the United States Continental Congress.108  The Ordinance
created the procedure by which states in what would eventually be-
come the Midwest would be admitted to the Union.109  The drafters of
the Ordinance and the iterations that preceded it were very concerned
with how to equitably integrate new states into the United States and
bind those newly admitted states to the existing ones.110  Ultimately,
the Northwest Ordinance provided the procedure by which thirty-one
of the fifty states entered the Union.  It prohibited slavery in those
states, and established the equal-footing doctrine, which will be dis-
cussed in great detail below.111
In 1784, Thomas Jefferson chaired a committee that made the first
attempt to devise a method to accomplish this integration.112  Jeffer-
son’s Plan for Government of the Western Territory established a
107. Id.
108. See generally David G. Chardavoyne, The Northwest Ordinance and Michigan’s Territo-
rial Heritage, in THE HISTORY OF MICHIGAN LAW 13 (Paul Finkelman & Martin J. Hershock
eds., 2006).
109. Id. at 13–14.
110. PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
44–45 (1987).
111. Dennis P. Duffy, Note, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 929, 930–31 (1995).
112. Chardavoyne, supra note 108, at 14.
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formula for determining new state boundaries.113  The government
would also buy land from the Indians and sell it to settlers of the
Northwest Territories.114  Once the population of the territories
reached 20,000 “free inhabitants,” the residents of that region could
form a state, and once the population of that state was equal to “the
least numerous of the thirteen original states,” the fledgling state
would be admitted to the Union on equal footing with all of the other
existing states.115
Congress ultimately did not implement Jefferson’s plan, instead
electing a route with a more nebulous definition of boundaries and
with a more distant promise of statehood than that offered by Jeffer-
son.116  Thus the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was drafted and im-
posed on the Territories, many of which would eventually become the
Great Lakes states that we know today.117
The 1787 Ordinance provided for three stages on the path to state-
hood.  In the first stage, the congressionally appointed governor and a
number of judges in the region would function as executive, judicial,
and legislative officers, with Congress retaining veto power over the
acts of these officials.118  The second stage began when the population
of the district reached “five thousand free male inhabitants of full
age” at which time the district could elect its own general assembly,
with one representative for every five hundred free male inhabi-
tants.119  Additionally, instead of the latitudinally and longitudinally
based plan described by Jefferson, the metes and bounds of the new
northwestern states were not mathematically provided for in the new
113. ONUF, supra note 110, at 46–47 (“That so much of the territory ceded or to be ceded by
individual states to the United States, as is already purchased or shall be purchased of the Indian
inhabitants, and offered for sale by Congress, shall be divided into distinct states, in the follow-
ing manner, as nearly as such cessions will admit; that is to say, by parallels of latitude, so that
each state shall comprehend from north to south two degrees of latitude, beginning to count
from the completion of forty-five degrees north of the equator; and by meridians of longitude,
one of which shall pass through the lowest point of the rapids of Ohio, and the other through the
western cape of the mouth of the Great Kanhaway: but the territory eastward of this last merid-
ian, between the Ohio, Lake Erie, and Pennsylvania, shall be one state whatsoever may be its
comprehension of latitude.  That which may lie beyond the completion of the 45th degree be-
tween the said meridians, shall make part of the state adjoining it on the south: and that part of
the Ohio, which is between the same meridians coinciding nearly with that parallel as a bound-
ary line.” (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, PLAN FOR GOVERNMENT OF THE WESTERN TERRITORY
(1784)).
114. Chardavoyne, supra note 108, at 14.
115. Id.; see also ONUF, supra note 110, at 46.
116. ONUF, supra note 110, at 55.
117. Chardavoyne, supra note 108, at 14–15; see also ONUF, supra note 110, at 60–61 (repro-
ducing the complete text of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787).
118. Chardavoyne, supra note 108, at 15.
119. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787 § 9, reprinted in 1 U.S.C., at LV, LVI (2006).
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Ordinance; rather, the Ordinance stated that there would be “not less
than three nor more than five States” and provided four boundaries
defined by rivers and more arbitrary lines between landmarks.120
The final stage was full statehood.  The settlements in the North-
west attained this stage once their population reached sixty thousand
free inhabitants.121  Additionally, in prescribing the final step toward
statehood, the Ordinance declared that these new states would enter
the Union on equal footing with the existing states.122  The equal-foot-
ing provisions of the Northwest Ordinance were very important to the
eventual development of the new states because it assured settlers
that they would not be treated as mere settlers if they moved to the
Northwest Territories, but would be given full recognition as citizens,
with all of the attendant rights and civil liberties of complete citizen-
ship.123  The equal-footing doctrine also became the basis for granting
the states the same title rights in submerged lands as the original thir-
teen colonies.
A. Equal-Footing Doctrine
The equal-footing doctrine established in the Northwest Ordinance
gains significance in light of the rule for state title to beds below navi-
gable waters.  State title to the beds under navigable waters has ori-
gins in English common law.124  Historically, English law gave the
crown title to waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, while
private riparians generally owned title to the beds below nontidal wa-
ters.125  American courts, however, found that the “tidal rule of ‘navi-
gability’ for sovereign ownership of riverbeds, while perhaps
appropriate for England’s dominant coastal geography, was ill suited
to the United States with its vast number of major inland rivers upon
which navigation could be sustained.”126  The Supreme Court eventu-
ally “recognized ‘the now prevailing doctrine’ of state sovereign ‘title
in the soil of rivers really navigable.’  This title rule became known as
‘navigability in fact.’”127  Thanks to the equal-footing doctrine, the ti-
120. Id. art. V, at LVII.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Matthew J. Festa, Property and Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 409, 459 (2013).
124. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894).
125. See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1226–27 (2012).
126. Id. (citing LOUIS HOUCK, LAW OF NAVIGABLE RIVERS 26–27, 31–35 (1868); Packer v.
Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667–69 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1891)).
127. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Shively, 152 U.S. at 31) (citing Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S.
324, 336 (1877) (“In this country, as a general thing, all waters are deemed navigable which are
really so . . . .”)).
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tle rule applies not just to the thirteen original states,128 but to all
states subsequently admitted to the Union.129
The Supreme Court recently summarized the title consequences of
the equal-footing doctrine as follows:
Upon statehood, the State gains title within its borders to the beds
of waters then navigable (or tidally influenced . . . ).  It may allocate
and govern those lands according to state law subject only to “the
paramount power of the United States to control such waters for
purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce.”  The
United States retains any title vested in it before statehood to any
land beneath waters not then navigable (and not tidally influenced),
to be transferred or licensed if and as it chooses.130
To determine whether a waterbody is navigable for purposes of
state title, the Supreme Court first looks to the “navigable in fact” test
from The Daniel Ball:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact.  And they are navigable in fact when
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
on water.131
But that is not the end of the inquiry.  For purposes of state title under
the equal-footing doctrine, navigability is determined at the time of
statehood using historical evidence to determine the “natural and or-
dinary condition” of the water.132  This determination regarding navi-
gability in fact, at the time of statehood, is a matter of federal law.133
Congress has made explicit that the individual states have title to the
Great Lakes bottomlands pursuant to the federal Submerged Lands
128. Cf. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842) (noting that the thirteen original
states “hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them”).
129. See, e.g., Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374
(1977); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950); Shively, 152 U.S. at 26–31; Knight v.
U.S. Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228–29
(1845).
130. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1227–28 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Oregon,
295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935)).
131. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).  Note that the Daniel Ball navigable-
in-fact test is used, in slightly different permutations, to determine navigability for Commerce
Clause jurisdiction and the scope of congressional regulatory authority. See PPL Mont., 132 S.
Ct. at 1228–29.  The variations in the application of the federal navigability test can be dizzying,
but Justice Kennedy’s decision in PPL Montana offers an excellent summary. See id.  In sum-
mary, the key aspect of the federal navigability test for state title is determining the natural
condition of the waterway at the time of statehood.  See id. at 1228 (citing United States v. Utah,
283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931)).
132. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1233 (quoting Utah, 283 U.S. at 76).
133. Id.; see also Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14; Utah, 283 U.S. at 75.
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Act.134  However, the states have discretion to determine the exact
bounds and implications of state title to submerged lands, and this
impacts Great Lakes shoreline ownership and protection.
Michigan and Wisconsin have adopted the ordinary high water
mark as the upland boundary of their state’s submerged lands for their
respective Great Lakes shoreline.135  The ordinary high water mark
lies where “the presence and action of the water is so continuous as to
leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vege-
tation, or other easily recognized characteristic.”136  Rejecting this ap-
proach, Ohio uses the “natural shoreline,” defined as “the line at
which water usually stands when free from disturbing causes,” as the
boundary between privately owned uplands and the state-owned
lakebed.137  When a state uses the high water mark or a similar bound-
ary to determine state versus private ownership, it essentially opens
up portions of the beach (above the water’s edge up to the high water
mark) to the public, creating opportunities for beach walking and
other land-based recreation that would not otherwise be possible.138
Conversely, putting the boundary at the water’s edge may limit the
state’s ability to regulate shoreline property without triggering a regu-
latory taking.
B. Interstate Compacts
The U.S. Constitution allows states to aggregate their authority with
the permission of Congress through the Compact Clause.  A compact
is essentially a contract between states, subject to federal approval.139
The compact mechanism is provided in Article I, Section Ten, of the
Constitution, which declares that “[n]o State shall, without the Con-
sent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with an-
other State, or with a foreign Power.”140
Congressional approval of compacts is critical to the federal–state
balance of power, as interstate compacts tend to increase the power of
the states at the expense of the federal government.  Once effective,
interstate compacts have the full force and supremacy of federal
134. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).
135. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 71–73 (Mich. 2005); State v. Trudeau, 408
N.W.2d 337, 342 (Wis. 1987).
136. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62.
137. State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., 955 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio 2011).
138. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 58.
139. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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law.141  This allows the terms of a compact to be enforced in federal
court and prevents states from ignoring their compact duties.142  Fu-
ture Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter and James Landis first
suggested using compacts to manage interstate natural resources over
eighty years ago.143  There are now approximately fifty interstate com-
pacts that in some way relate to interstate waters144 and two specific
compacts relevant to the Great Lakes.
Congress approved the first Great Lakes Basin Compact in 1968,
although it was negotiated by the Great Lakes states and provinces
two decades earlier.145  It includes each of the eight Great Lakes
states as members and creates a Great Lakes Commission comprised
of representatives from the member states.146  As negotiated by the
states, the Great Lakes Basin Compact included a provision to allow
the provinces of Ontario and Quebec to join as parties.147 However, to
protect the federal interest in foreign relations, Congress explicitly re-
fused to consent to that provision.148  As a consolation prize, the Ca-
nadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec have recently been added as
associate members.149
The purpose of the Great Lakes Basin Compact and the Great
Lakes Commission is to gather data and make nonbinding advisory
recommendations regarding research and cooperative programs for
the Great Lakes.150  The Great Lakes Commission can make recom-
mendations regarding “uniform . . . laws, ordinances, or regulations
relating to the development, use and conservation of the Basin’s water
resources.”151  However, this function is purely advisory—the Great
Lakes Basin Compact makes clear that “no action of the [Great
Lakes] Commission shall have the force of law in, or be binding upon,
any party state.”152  Professor Joe Dellapenna describes this as a
141. See Culyer v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981) (stating that congressional consent “trans-
forms an interstate compact . . . into a law of the United States”).
142. See Texas, 482 U.S. at 128.
143. See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).
144. Noah D. Hall, Interstate Water Compacts and Climate Change Adaptation, 5 ENVTL. &
ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 237, 259 (2010).
145. Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968).
146. Id. arts. II, IV, 82 Stat. at 414–16.
147. Id. art. II.B, 82 Stat. at 414.
148. Id. art. IX, § 2, 82 Stat. at 419.
149. See Mark Squillace & Sandra Zellmer, Managing Interjurisdictional Waters Under the
Great Lakes Charter Annex, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 2003, at 8, 9.
150. Great Lakes Basin Compact, art. VI(A), (G), (N), 82 Stat. at 417–18.
151. Id. art. VI(G), 82 Stat. at 417.
152. Id. art. VI(N), 82 Stat. at 418.
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“we’ll keep in touch” approach to interstate water management that
rarely achieves the lofty goals set forth in such agreements.153
With the shortcomings of the 1968 Great Lakes Compact and more
recent concerns over Great Lakes water diversions and water use,154
the Great Lakes governors and premiers negotiated a new set of
agreements that became the 2008 Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River
Basin Water Resources Compact155 and companion Great Lakes–St.
Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement.156
The Agreement is a nonbinding policy between the American states
and the Canadian provinces, implemented in Canada by the provinces
and in the United States through the Compact.  The Compact and
Agreement use minimum standards for water use and withdrawals ad-
ministered primarily under the authority of individual states and prov-
inces, and create a governance structure that balances state
sovereignty and regional management.
At the core of the Compact and Agreement are the common stan-
dards (referred to as the “Decision-making Standard”157) for new or
increased water withdrawals of Great Lakes Basin water.  The appli-
cability of these standards is not limited to water taken directly from
one of the Great Lakes.  Rather, the compact broadly defines the wa-
ters of the Great Lakes to include all tributary surface and ground
waters.158
The Compact takes two different approaches to managing new or
increased water withdrawals in the Great Lakes Basin, based almost
entirely on whether the water is used inside or outside of the Great
Lakes Basin surface watershed boundary.  Water use inside of the
Great Lakes Basin is managed solely by the individual state, with lim-
ited advisory input from other states for very large consumptive
uses.159  Diversions of water for use outside of the Basin are subject to
153. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern States and the
Struggle Over the ’Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 838–39 (2005).
154. See generally PETER ANNIN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS (2006).
155. Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342,
122 Stat. 3739 (2008).
156. Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement (Dec.
13, 2005) [hereinafter Great Lakes Agreement], available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/
docs/12-13-05/Great_Lakes-St_Lawrence_River_Basin_Sustainable_Water_Resources_Agree-
ment.pdf.
157. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Compact,
§ 4.11, 122 Stat. at 3755.
158. See id. § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 3742 (defining “Waters of the Basin or Basin Water”).
159. See id. §§ 4.3, .6, 122 Stat. at 3749, 3752.
2014] LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF THE GREAT LAKES 747
a spectrum of collective rules and approval processes, including a gen-
eral prohibition on most diversions.160
The Great Lakes Compact requires the states to “create a program
for the management and regulation of New or Increased Withdraw-
als . . . by adopting and implementing Measures consistent with the
Decision-Making Standard” within five years.161  States must set the
threshold levels for regulation of water withdrawals to “ensure that
uses overall are reasonable, that Withdrawals overall will not result in
significant impacts . . . , and that all other objectives of the Compact
are achieved.”162  If states fail to establish thresholds that comply with
these requirements, a default threshold of regulating all new or in-
creased withdrawals of 100,000 gallons per day or greater (averaged
over any ninety-day period) is imposed.163  The states must make re-
ports to the Compact Council, which is comprised of the governor of
each party state, regarding their implementation.164  The Compact
Council must then review the state programs and make findings re-
garding their adequacy and compliance with the compact.165
The Great Lakes Compact has a general prohibition on new or in-
creased diversions of Great Lakes water.166  The ban has several ex-
ceptions for interbasin transfers and diversions to nearby communities
that either straddle the watershed divide or are within a country that
straddles the watershed divide.  All of the exceptions are subject to
the “exception standard”167 and additional process, review, and re-
gional oversight.  Most notably, large diversions are subject to the
unanimous approval of the Compact Council (comprised of each of
the governors).168
In addition to providing a mechanism for unanimous approval of
the diversion exceptions, the Compact Council has numerous other
powers and duties.  Comprised of the governors of each party state (or
their designated alternates), it can promulgate and enforce rules to
160. See id. §§ 4.8–.9, 122 Stat. at 3752.
161. Id. § 4.10(1), 122 Stat. at 3755.
162. Id.
163. Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Compact, § 4.10(2),
122 Stat. at 3755.
164. See id. § 3.4(1), 122 Stat. at 3746.
165. See id. § 3.4(2), 122 Stat. at 3746–47.
166. See id. § 4.8, 122 Stat. at 3752.
167. The “exception standard” is substantively similar to the decision-making standard. See
id. § 4.9(4), 122 Stat. at 3754.
168. Id. § 4.9(2)(c), 122 Stat. at 3753.  The unanimous approval may include abstentions. See
id. (“Council approval shall be given unless one or more Council Members vote to
disapprove.”).
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implement its duties under the Compact.169  The Compact Council
also has broad authority to plan, conduct research, prepare reports on
water use, and forecast water levels.170  Perhaps most importantly, it
can conduct special investigations and institute court actions, includ-
ing enforcement.171
However, enforcement is not the sole domain of the Compact
Council.  The Great Lakes Compact contains broad and comprehen-
sive enforcement provisions at both the state and interstate levels.
Any aggrieved person can commence a civil enforcement action in the
appropriate state court against a water user that has failed to obtain a
required permit or has violated the prohibition on diversions.172
Remedies include equitable relief and the prevailing party may re-
cover reasonable attorney and expert witness fees.173  Any person, in-
cluding another state or province, can challenge a state action under
the Compact (such as issuance of a permit) pursuant to state adminis-
trative law, with an express right of judicial review in state court.174
The broad enforcement provisions are complemented by similarly
progressive public participation provisions.  As with the minimum
substantive decision-making standard, the Compact provides mini-
mum procedural public process requirements for the party states and
Compact Council.  These include: public notification of applications
with a reasonable time for comments; public accessibility to all docu-
ments (including comments); standards for determining whether to
hold a public meeting or hearing on an application; and allowing open
public inspection of all records relating to decisions.175  The Compact
also requires additional formal consultation with federally recognized
Indian tribes in the relevant state.176  In recognition of the tribes’ sta-
tus as sovereigns (discussed in Part IV), such consultation is handled
primarily through either the Compact Council or Regional Body (dis-
cussed below).177
The Great Lakes Compact has no termination date; it remains in
force unless terminated by a majority of the party states (five of the
169. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Compact,
§§ 2.1–.3, 3.3(1), 122 Stat. at 3744–46.
170. Id. § 3.2, 122 Stat. at 3746.
171. Id.
172. Id. § 7.3(3), 122 Stat. at 3761.
173. See id. § 7.3(3)(b)(ii), 122 Stat. at 3761–62.
174. See id. § 7.3(1), 122 Stat. at 3761.
175. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Compact, § 6.2,
122 Stat. at 3760.
176. Id. § 5.1, 122 Stat. at 3759.
177. See id.
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eight).178  As is typical for interstate water compacts, it is very difficult
to amend once enacted.179  Amendments would require unanimous
approval by all state legislative bodies and the consent of Congress.180
State–provincial cooperation is widely desired, but state leaders
were well aware of the experience of the 1968 Compact and the failed
attempt to include the Canadian provinces.  To meet the goal of
state–provincial cooperation without running afoul of constitutional
treaty limitations, the governors and premiers developed a companion
nonbinding good faith agreement that includes the provinces of Onta-
rio and Quebec, the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustaina-
ble Water Resources Agreement.181  This dual structure creates a
legally and politically acceptable mechanism for cooperation with Ca-
nadian provinces.
State cooperation with Canadian provinces in the Great Lakes re-
gion has obvious ecological and policy benefits, but raises fundamen-
tal legal and political concerns.  The Compact Clause of the
Constitution, included in Article I, Section Ten, provides that “[n]o
State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agree-
ment or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.”182
The Compact Clause also provides that “[n]o State shall enter into
any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”183  Thus, the prohibition on
states entering into a “Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation” is absolute,
while the prohibition on states entering into an “Agreement or Com-
pact,” even with a foreign government, is limited only by the political
decision of Congress to consent.184
The question of what constitutes a “Treaty, Alliance, or Confedera-
tion” versus an “Agreement or Compact” can in theory open the door
to major constitutional issues of separation of powers and federal-
ism.185  In the case of the Great Lakes, there is a sensible answer.
178. Id. § 8.7, 122 Stat. at 3763.
179. See Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Perma-
nence Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 108–09 (2003).
180. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Compact, § 8.5,
122 Stat. at 3763.
181. Great Lakes Agreement, supra note 156.
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
183. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
184. Despite the plain language of the Compact Clause, congressional consent may not be
necessary for interstate compacts relating to matters in which the United States has no possible
interest or concern, or that do not increase the states’ political power. See Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503, 519–21 (1893).
185. It is left to Congress to determine whether a proposed arrangement is a prohibited
“Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation” or a permissible “Agreement or Compact.” See Frank-
furter & Landis, supra note 143, 694–95.  This determination may elude a rigid legal analysis
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Congress has already exercised its treaty powers in this area through
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, and it could view any attempt by
the states to enter into a binding management arrangement with the
provinces on a related subject as an impermissible treaty.186  Further,
even if Congress viewed such an arrangement with the provinces as a
compact rather than a treaty, it would likely reject either the entire
compact or the inclusion of the provinces.  This lesson has already
been learned in the Great Lakes; as described above, when the Great
Lakes states proposed including the provinces in the original Great
Lakes Compact over fifty years ago, Congress rejected the provincial
participation and only approved the compact among the states.187
While Congress would not likely allow a binding agreement be-
tween the states and provinces, in its 2000 amendments to the Water
Resources Development Act it stated a desire for the states to work
“in consultation with” the provinces to develop a Great Lakes water
management agreement.188  The states were wise to interpret this con-
gressional encouragement not as permission to negotiate a compact
with the provinces, but rather to develop a nonbinding cooperative
approach to Great Lakes water management that involves the
provinces.
The Great Lakes Compact incorporates the provinces through the
Great Lakes Agreement’s “Regional Body,” comprised of representa-
tives from each state and province.189 The primary mechanism for
achieving this purpose is the “Regional Review” procedure conducted
by the Regional Body.  The Regional Body’s authority could be fairly
described as procedural rather than substantive, and its determina-
tions described as advisory rather than final.  The Regional Body’s
role includes notice, consultation, and public participation, but stops
short of final decision making.190  The parties and Compact Council
need only “consider” (but not follow) Regional Review findings.191
The Regional Review process is also limited to “regionally significant
since it is “in a field in which political judgment is, to say the least, one of the important factors.”
Id. at 695 n.37.
186. Congress has already refused to authorize the Great Lakes states from entering into any
arrangement with Canadian jurisdictions that could be viewed as a treaty or limitation of the
United States’ treaty-making powers when it approved the original Great Lakes Basin Compact.
See Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, §§ 2–3, 82 Stat. 414, 419 (1968).
187. See id.
188. Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 504, 114 Stat. 2572,
2644–45 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1962d–20(b) (2006)).
189. See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Compact, Pub.
L. No. 110-342, § 1.2, 122 Stat. 3739, 3741 (2008) (defining “Regional Body”).
190. See id. § 4.5, 122 Stat. at 3749–51.
191. See id. § 4.5(5)(i), 122 Stat. at 3751.
2014] LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF THE GREAT LAKES 751
or potentially precedent setting” proposals (as determined by a major-
ity of the members of the Regional Body) and the exceptions to the
prohibition on diversions discussed above.192
The Regional Review process avoids infringing on federal treaty
powers, but still gives the provinces an evaluative and procedural role
that may prove useful for affecting major decisions.  The Regional Re-
view process could have influences similar to that of the environmen-
tal review process required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).193  Like Regional Review, NEPA’s environmental review
can be considered procedural. Yet over time, it may have both subtle
and direct effects on agency decision making.
C. Interstate Nuisance
The federalist system of governance and the exercise of state au-
thority often results in legal conflicts between states. State sover-
eignty, at least in an absolute sense, must yield to the political and
legal realities of having neighbors and sharing resources.  In the con-
text of Great Lakes governance, one state’s exercise of its sovereignty
to develop its water resources will unavoidably interfere with a neigh-
boring state’s exercise of its sovereignty to protect its territory.  While
interstate compacts, as discussed above, can avoid some of these con-
flicts, litigation is inevitable.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over disputes between
states pursuant to Article III of the Constitution.194  As detailed be-
low, the Court invoked this jurisdiction to resolve a regional dispute
over Chicago’s use and diversion of Great Lakes water in Wisconsin v.
Illinois.195  While the Court has exercised its jurisdiction to adjudicate
interstate nuisance pollution claims over the past century,196 in recent
decades the Court has become reluctant to exercise its jurisdiction
over these technical and time consuming disputes.197  When faced with
192. See id. § 4.5(1)(c), (f), 122 Stat. at 3749–50.  A state may, at its discretion and after con-
sulting with the proposal applicant, seek Regional Review for any other proposal within its juris-
diction. Id. § 4.5(2)(c)(ii), 122 Stat. at 3750.
193. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2006)) (requiring review of potential environmental impacts
from major federal actions).
194. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction.”).
195. Wisconsin v. Illinois (Wisconsin I), 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
196. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907).
197. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems.
Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
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such disputes, the Court’s decisions have focused on the preemption
of federal common law by federal regulatory statutes198 and the appli-
cability of state common law to interstate transboundary pollution.199
As discussed above, Congress has significant powers and jurisdic-
tion pursuant to the Commerce Clause to regulate and manage water
resources.  However, in the absence of congressional statutory law,
the Supreme Court has developed a federal common law of interstate
nuisance and equitable apportionment to resolve pollution and water
use disputes between the states.200  As a result, federal common law
effectively limits state sovereignty (and protects state territorial integ-
rity) in the context of interstate litigation.201 The Supreme Court’s ap-
plication of its interstate nuisance and equitable apportionment
doctrines is thus a key part of the Great Lakes governance picture.
The Supreme Court’s adjudication of the Chicago diversion litiga-
tion in a long series of Wisconsin v. Illinois cases202 shaped the legal
rules for state use of shared Great Lakes waters and continues to play
a substantive role in Great Lakes governance.  The story of the Chi-
cago diversion and resulting litigation has been told before,203 but a
brief recap is important for understanding Great Lakes law and gov-
ernance today.
By the late nineteenth century, Chicago was quickly growing into
one of the nation’s largest cities.  But the city on the shores of Lake
Michigan had a water problem—Chicago was disposing of its sewage
into Lake Michigan (via the Chicago River), while taking its drinking
water from the same source.  As a result, the population suffered from
outbreaks of chronic waterborne illnesses.204  But the city’s engineers
rose to the challenge, building a canal to reverse the flow of the Chi-
198. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
199. See, e.g., Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
200. See Noah D. Hall, Political Externalities, Federalism, and a Proposal for an Interstate
Environmental Impact Assessment Policy, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 61–70 (2008).
201. For analyses of the Supreme Court’s transboundary pollution caselaw, see generally
Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931 (1997); Robert
V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law of Interstate
Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717 (2004). For similarly excellent analyses of the Supreme Court’s
interstate waters equitable apportionment caselaw, see generally Robert Haskell Abrams, Inter-
state Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primer for Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 155 (2002); A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and
Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381 (1985).
202. Wisconsin v. Illinois (Wisconsin VI), 449 U.S. 48 (1980); Wisconsin v. Illinois (Wisconsin
V), 388 U.S. 426 (1967) (per curiam); Wisconsin v. Illinois (Wisconsin IV), 289 U.S. 395 (1933);
Wisconsin v. Illinois (Wisconsin III), 281 U.S. 696 (1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois (Wisconsin II),
281 U.S. 179 (1930); Wisconsin I, 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
203. See Hall, supra note 6, at 419–22; see also Percival, supra note 201, at 718–32.
204. See Hall, supra note 6, at 419–20.
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cago River, changing its output from Lake Michigan to the Illinois
River, and ultimately to the Mississippi River and Gulf of Mexico.  At
the time, the Chicago River diversion was viewed as a tremendous
engineering accomplishment, linking the two major waterways of the
Midwest—the Great Lakes and Mississippi River systems.  In retro-
spect, Professor Dan Tarlock’s description of the Chicago River diver-
sion as “an epic environmentally unsound public works project,”205
has proved more accurate by the year, as the unanticipated environ-
mental problems from connecting two naturally separate aquatic eco-
systems mount (especially the introduction and spread of invasive
species).
While the invasion of nonnative species through the artificial con-
nection is a pressing environmental concern today, the first complaint
about the Chicago River diversion came from the states downstream
on the Mississippi River that began to receive Chicago’s sewage waste.
Missouri brought an interstate nuisance action in the Supreme Court,
challenging Illinois’s discharge of sewage into the Mississippi River
system.206  The case gave the Supreme Court its first opportunity to
consider the role of the federal courts in resolving interstate environ-
mental disputes and governing interstate natural resources.
The Court began by recognizing the partial relinquishment by the
individual states of their sovereign powers as necessary to the estab-
lishment of a united and federalist nation.  Yet this relinquishment of
sovereignty meant that the Supreme Court must necessarily furnish a
forum for the resolution of disputes between states.207  The Articles of
Confederation had created an alternative method for resolving inter-
state disputes,208 but Article III of the Constitution vested this func-
tion in the judiciary.209  The Court’s conclusion is supported by a
historic account in the Federalist Papers, in which Alexander Hamil-
ton wrote that the Court would hear not only border disputes between
the states, but other forms of interstate disputes as well.210
205. Tarlock, supra note 201, at 392.
206. See Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri II), 200 U.S. 496 (1906); see also Missouri v. Illinois
(Missouri I), 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (overruling Illinois’s demurrer to Missouri’s complaint).
207. See Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 241.
208. The ninth article of the Articles of Confederation had provided for a tribunal method of
state–state dispute resolution, whereby the offended state would petition Congress to assemble
the functional equivalent of an arbitration panel to hear and decide the controversy. See id. at
220–21 (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX).
209. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, §13, 1 Stat. 73, 80
(1789).
210. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books, 1992)
(“[T]here are many other sources, besides interfering claims of boundary, from which bickerings
and animosities may spring up among the members of the Union. . . .  Whatever practices may
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While the Court was clear about its constitutional authority to adju-
dicate interstate environmental disputes, it was equally weary of hav-
ing its jurisdiction invoked.  It thus established several jurisdictional
standards that must be met.  The first is that “States are in direct an-
tagonism as States.”211  The Court will recognize any harm to the
state’s traditional sovereign interests, such as the property, health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens, as a sufficient basis for suit against
another state.212  Further, the state action requirement can be met by
indirect action by a state or direct action by a state’s entity or subdivi-
sion (e.g., the Chicago Sanitary District).213  Second, the case must “be
of serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved.”214 Finally, the case
must be susceptible to judicial resolution.215
Despite exercising its jurisdiction to hear the dispute and providing
a forum to resolve competing claims of state sovereignty, the Court
ultimately declined to offer Missouri any relief. As is typical in com-
mon law nuisance claims over environmental pollution, Missouri
struggled to establish sufficient technical and scientific proof regard-
ing its allegations.  Justice Holmes noted that Missouri’s case “de-
pend[ed] upon an inference of the unseen.”216  Proving causation was
difficult for Missouri given the long distance (357 miles) from Chicago
to St. Louis.217  Justice Holmes wrote: “The experts differ as to the
time and distance within which a stream would purify itself.  No case
of an epidemic caused by infection at so remote a source is brought
forward, and the cases which are produced are controverted.”218  Ulti-
mately, the Court held that Missouri could not adequately prove cau-
sation because the scientific evidence presented could not establish
Illinois’s discharge of sewage into the Chicago River as the sole or
primary source of pollution in the Mississippi River.219
Missouri’s failed challenge was just the beginning of the legal saga.
Chicago’s population (and sewage output) continued to grow, and the
city increased the diversions from Lake Michigan from 2,541 cubic
have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the states, are proper objects of federal super-
intendence and control.”).
211. Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 249 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
212. See id. at 236–37, 241 (majority opinion).
213. See id. at 241.
214. Missouri II, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 522.
217. Id. at 523.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 525–26.
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feet per second (cfs) in 1900 up to 8,500 cfs by 1924.220  With more
water being drained from Lake Michigan, the states of Wisconsin,
Michigan, and New York (later joined by almost every other Great
Lakes state) brought suit in the Supreme Court against Illinois.  The
plaintiff states’ complaint alleged that the Chicago diversion lowered
levels in Lake Michigan by more than six inches.  The states claimed
harms to navigation and serious injuries to their citizens and prop-
erty.221  Illinois argued in response that: (1) the diversion was neces-
sary for the health of its population; (2) the federal government
approved of the diversion; and (3) the diversion did not cause any
actual injury.222
The Supreme Court appointed former Chief Justice and Secretary
of State Charles Evan Hughes to serve as special master to gather
evidence and administer the litigation.223  In his report to the Court,
Hughes determined that Chicago’s diversion lowered the levels of
Lakes Michigan and Huron by six inches and Lakes Erie and Ontario
by five inches.224  As a result of the lowered water levels, there was
damage “to navigation and commercial interests, to structures, to the
convenience of summer resorts, to fishing and hunting grounds, to
public parks and other enterprises, and to riparian property gener-
ally.”225  The Court agreed with Hughes’s findings regarding the
“great losses” to the complainant states.226  The Court also rejected
the federal permit defense, finding that the federal permit was merely
a response to the public health threat of the sewage and not a federal
decision regarding interstate allocation of the Great Lakes.227
Although the Court was sympathetic to the claims of the complain-
ant states, it was also concerned with the public health implications
and economic costs of immediately halting the entire Chicago diver-
220. See Wisconsin I, 278 U.S. 367, 404, 417 (1929); see also Sanitary Dist. of Chi. v. United
States, 266 U.S. 405, 413 (1925).
221. Wisconsin I, 278 U.S. at 400.
222. See id. at 409–11.  In separate litigation, Chicago’s Sanitary District was found to be in
violation of its federal permit to divert 4,167 cfs from Lake Michigan. See Sanitary Dist. of Chi.,
266 U.S. at 430–32; see also Percival, supra note 201, at 729.  However, in 1925 the Secretary of
War amended the permit, allowing the diversion to increase to 8,500 cfs provided the Chicago
Sanitary District began to employ artificial sewage treatment processes. See Wisconsin I, 278
U.S. at 417–18; see also Percival, supra note 201, at 729.
223. Wisconsin I, 278 U.S. at 399.  Hughes was originally appointed to the Supreme Court in
1910, but left the Court in 1916 for an unsuccessful run for President.  From 1921 to 1925,
Hughes served as Secretary of State under President Warren G. Harding.
224. Id. at 407.
225. Id. at 408.
226. Id. at 409.
227. See id. at 415–18.
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sion.228  The Court gave Hughes the unenviable task of balancing
these important competing interests in the context of state sover-
eignty.229  Hughes recommended, and the Court adopted, a phased
reduction in the Chicago diversion to give the city time to build ade-
quate sewage treatment.  By 1939 the allowable diversion was limited
to 1,500 cfs (plus domestic pumping).230  The case has never closed,
and the party states have brought subsequent motions to the Supreme
Court regarding Illinois’s compliance with the diversion reduction
schedule and the amount of water allowed for domestic pumping.  The
bottom line for the Great Lakes is that after nearly a century of litiga-
tion, the Chicago River diversion is now capped at 3,200 cfs.231
Legal scholars may note that the Court’s reasoning and decision re-
garding the Chicago River Great Lakes diversion differs subtly but
importantly from its decisions regarding interstate disputes over west-
ern rivers.  The Court did not rely on its equitable apportionment doc-
trine from prior cases, which simply divided and allocated
transboundary rivers between two or more states.232  Instead of divvy-
ing up the Great Lakes (or at least some portion of the available water
supply) between the competing states, Chief Justice William Howard
Taft’s decisions sought to define the bounds of the states’ shared rea-
sonable use duties.233  Perhaps the former President from Ohio—
whose administration had negotiated the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909 between the United States and Canada234—appreciated the gov-
ernance challenge inherent in a resource shared among two countries
and eight states and the need to respect the many competing values
and uses of the Great Lakes.235  While some water diversions from the
Great Lakes may be necessary, the Court understood the ultimate im-
portance in preserving the integrity of the Great Lakes system.
D. Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce
The Commerce Clause creates a different hurdle to state water pol-
icy.  The states’ broad regulatory powers over their waters are limited
by the Dormant Commerce Clause—the federal government’s author-
228. See id. at 420–21.
229. See Wisconsin I, 278 U.S. at 421.
230. Wisconsin II, 281 U.S. 179, 198, 201 (1930); see also Wisconsin III, 281 U.S. 696, 697
(1930).
231. See Wisconsin IV, 289 U.S. 395 (1933); Wisconsin V, 388 U.S. 426, 427 (1967); Wisconsin
VI, 449 U.S. 48 (1980).
232. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
233. See Hall, supra note 6, at 422.
234. See supra Part I.
235. Id.
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ity to void state laws that impermissibly burden interstate com-
merce.236  The Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause analysis consists of
two stages.  First, facial discrimination by states against interstate
commerce is per se invalid and those laws must therefore fail.237  Sec-
ond, if the state law is not facially discriminatory, but still in some way
impacts interstate commerce, the permissibility of the law will turn on
the application of the reasonableness factors first described in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.  Statutes that affect interstate commerce but
“even-handedly . . . effectuate a legitimate local public interest” will
be upheld unless the burden imposed by those statutes is “clearly ex-
cessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”238  If there is in fact a
legitimate local purpose, the permissibility of the state law will turn on
the “nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”239  This
analysis usually entails a balancing approach applied by the court.240
The Commerce Clause limitations thus present a powerful obstacle
to state water management of the Great Lakes.  The doctrine could
limit the ability of a state to control or restrict the export of its water.
In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, the Supreme Court first held
that groundwater was an article of interstate commerce.241  The Court
then held that a Nebraska statute restricting the export of ground-
water from Nebraska to states that grant a reciprocal right to import
water to Nebraska was unconstitutional.242  Although Sporhase in-
volved a dispute about a state groundwater statute, the holding from
the case most likely applies to surface water as well.243
Sporhase is significant in the context of Great Lakes governance
because it holds that water is an article of interstate commerce and
236. See generally Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); Chris Seldin,
Comment, Interstate Marketing of Indian Water Rights: The Impacts of the Commerce Clause, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 1545, 1553 (1999).
237. Robin Kundis Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of Multi-
state Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 771, 792 (2010); see also
Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doctrinal Post-
Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 996 (2013).
238. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941.
242. See id. at 953, 957–58.
243. Margaret Z. Ferguson, Comment, Instream Appropriations and the Dormant Commerce
Clause: Conserving Water for the Future, 75 GEO. L.J. 1701, 1723 (1987) (“Because the demise of
the legal fiction of state ownership, the interstate dimension of water, and the Court’s consistent
rejection of state resource isolation apply with the same force to surface water as to ground-
water, it is apparent that if faced with a case raising the issue, the Court will likely hold that
surface water is an article of commerce subject to the dormant commerce clause.”).
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state laws that seek to regulate the transfer of water must conform to
the limitations of the Commerce Clause doctrine.  However, despite
this certainty of federal power to affect Great Lakes governance and
water management, Sporhase also stands for the proposition that state
regulation of interstate water transfers may nonetheless be permissi-
ble if they are sufficiently reasonable and survive the Pike test.
A final note about the Dormant Commerce Clause is that it is
merely a default rule.  As discussed above in the context of the Clean
Water Act, Congress often creates roles for states within federal regu-
latory regimes, and the resulting state action may permissibly burden
interstate commerce.  Congress may also allow states to enact laws
that impact interstate commerce, often through approval of an inter-
state compact as occurred with the Great Lakes Compact.  With the
enactment of the Great Lakes Compact, Congress has allowed the
states to restrict the diversion and export of Great Lakes water out of
the Basin (and to other states), with the supremacy of federal law.
IV. TRIBAL GOVERNANCE
Tribal governance and the sovereignty of tribal nations play a key
role in the management of the Great Lakes.  The Commerce Clause
explicitly recognizes the power of the federal government to regulate
commerce with “the Indian Tribes,”244 and the inclusion of “Indian
Tribes” with “foreign Nations” and “States” seems to recognize the
tribes’ sovereignty.245  While the Treaty Clause does not explicitly ref-
erence tribes, the Supreme Court has consistently construed the
Clause as authorizing the President to make treaties with tribes.246  In
1871, Congress passed a statue prohibiting the President from making
further treaties with tribes, but the statute protects existing treaty
rights.247  Tribes thus have a unique, independent sovereignty from the
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
245. See Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy,
and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of
Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 656 (2009). But see Robert G. Natelson, The
Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201, 260, 265
(2007).
246. See, e.g., United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 197 (1876) (opin-
ing that the President’s power to enter treaties with tribes is “coextensive with that to make
treaties with foreign nations”).
247. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006)) (“No
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recog-
nized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or
tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.”).  Justice Thomas has
described 25 U.S.C. § 71 as “constitutionally suspect,” but nonetheless acknowledges that it “re-
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federal government and from the states.248  Consequently, tribes have
retained powers of self-government—an independence which gives
the Great Lakes tribes some specific authority over the Great
Lakes.249
That is not to say that tribal jurisdiction over the Great Lakes is
unfettered; U.S. policy toward tribal nations has only recently devel-
oped to the point where tribes are actually given authority rather than
being actively undermined by the U.S. government.  In the nineteenth
century, federal Indian policy was fixated on removing tribes to reser-
vations west of the Mississippi River.250  In the first part of the twenti-
eth century, the federal government’s policy shifted from removal to
the imposition of model laws and codes enforced by tribal police and
tribal courts, which were frequently antagonistic toward the people
they governed.251
It was not until the late twentieth century that federal policy toward
tribal nations began to emphasize autonomy and self-sufficiency.252
President Reagan enunciated this policy in 1983, stating that the ap-
propriate relationship with tribal governments was one that was “gov-
ernment to government.”253  The EPA also announced its own Indian
policy in the 1980s.254  Under this policy the EPA stated its desire to
work with Indian tribes on a government-to-government basis, recog-
nized tribal governments as primary parties for setting standards and
managing reservation environmental programs, and declared that it
intended to assist tribes in assuming management responsibility for
reservation lands.255  The EPA also declared its willingness to deal
flects the view of the political branches that the tribes had become purely a domestic matter.”
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
248. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L.
REV. 973, 974 (2010).
249. See generally Jacqueline Phelan Hand, Protecting the World’s Largest Body of Fresh
Water: The Often Overlooked Role of Indian Tribes’ Co-Management of the Great Lakes, 47
NAT. RESOURCES J. 815 (2007).
250. Id. at 817.
251. See Fletcher, supra note 248, at 984.
252. See Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 9, 2000) (stating that “[t]he United
States recognizes the right of Indian tribes to self-government and supports tribal sovereignty
and self-determination”); see also Hand, supra note 249, at 817–18.
253. Hand, supra note 249, at 817–18.
254. Id. at 818.
255. Id. (citing WILLIAM D RUCKELSHAUS, EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS 2, 4 (1984), available at http://www.epa.gov/
tribalportal/pdf/indian-policy-84.pdf).
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with tribes as states if those tribes met certain statutory and regulatory
criteria specified in the statutes administered by the EPA.256
United States policy toward tribal nations has greatly changed over
time and developed into a regime that affords Indian tribes an oppor-
tunity to meaningfully impact management of the Great Lakes.  Al-
though their role in governance was actively diminished for centuries
by the federal government and its agents, tribal nations have risen to
greater prominence in the last few decades in the context of Great
Lakes governance.  This change in policy, coupled with tribes’ tradi-
tional hunting, fishing, land, and water use rights, has opened the door
for a number of tribal Great Lakes governance bodies.257
Two examples of tribal Great Lakes governance bodies are the
Chippewa Ottawa Resource Authority and the Great Lakes Indian
Fish and Wildlife Commission.  The Chippewa Ottawa Resource Au-
thority (CORA) consists of six Michigan tribes and its purpose, as
enunciated in the organization’s charter, is to “ensur[e] the conserva-
tion and wise utilization of the natural resources reserved to the Tribes
in the Treaty of March 28, 1836.”258  CORA operates a fishery man-
agement program and studies water quality issues, such as invasive
species.259  CORA also possesses enforcement authority; it enforces
its own regulations and those of other federal agencies and may try
violators within its members’ tribal courts.260
In addition to the above scientific and enforcement responsibilities,
CORA also consults with experts in such agencies as the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, the Forest Service, and the Michigan Department of
Natural Resources in order to fulfill its mandate as a tribal Great
Lakes governance body.261  Importantly, CORA also consults with tri-
bal hunters and fishers in fulfilling its mandate.262
256. Id. at 819; see also Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2006); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1377(e) (2006) (authorizing the Environmental Protection Agency to treat tribes as states
under the Clean Water Act).
257. See Fletcher, supra note 248, 978–79 (“Indian nations are immune from suit in federal,
state, and tribal courts, as well as immune from state taxation and regulation inside of Indian
country.  Indian nations retain important treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather, as well as land
and water rights.  Indian nations have the authority to establish separate and independent gov-
ernments, to define their own citizenship requirements, to regulate the activities of their own
citizens, and even to punish the crimes of their own citizens and the citizens of other Indian
nations.  Indian nations even have some authority to tax and regulate the activities of non-Indi-
ans on Indian lands.” (footnotes omitted)).
258. Charter, CHIPPEWA OTTAWA RESOURCE AUTHORITY, art. 1, http://1836cora.org/docu-
ments/CoraCharter.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) [hereinafter CORA Charter].
259. Hand, supra note 249, at 822.
260. Id.
261. CORA Charter, supra note 258, art. 4.
262. Id.
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The Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission was formed
in 1984 as a result of a Seventh Circuit case which reaffirmed the
treaty rights of tribal nations in Wisconsin.263  The Commission’s mis-
sion is to coordinate between Ojibwa groups to jointly manage water
and fishery resources.264  Consequently, the Commission has promul-
gated regulations that it enforces through its game wardens.265
V. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS
The common law riparian reasonable use doctrine provides the
foundation for private water use rights in all eight of the Great Lakes
states (typical of states east of the Mississippi River).266  Under ripa-
rian law, an owner of land abutting a waterbody is a riparian and has
certain rights to the waterbody, including the right to make reasonable
use of the water, to wharf out, and to use the entire surface of the
waterbody for navigation.267  These riparian rights are correlative in
nature; they are subject to the equal rights of other riparians on the
same waterbody.  Thus, any given waterbody functions as a common
resource for the riparians who own property bordering it.268  Further,
the riparians do not own the water itself; instead, they possess a right
to use the water for certain purposes (a usufructuary right).  Rather
than an absolute right, it is a correlative right held subject to the usu-
fructuary rights of other riparians.269  Michigan courts, typical of ripa-
rian Great Lakes states, explain the application of the riparian
reasonable use doctrine as follows:
Under the reasonable use doctrine, “a riparian owner may make
any and all reasonable uses of the water, as long [as] they do not
unreasonably interfere with the other riparian owners’ opportunity
for reasonable use.”  “Whether and to what extent a given use shall
be allowed under the reasonable use doctrine depends upon the
weighing of factors on the would-be user’s side and balancing them
against similar factors on the side of other riparian owners.  No list
of factors is exhaustive, because the court will consider all the cir-
cumstances that are relevant in a given case.” While in theory no
single factor is conclusive, “[d]omestic uses are so favored that they
will generally prevail over other uses.”  Furthermore, while the rea-
263. Hand, supra note 249, at 821.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Western states have largely adopted the prior appropriation doctrine, which severs water
use rights from the land and prioritizes water use on a first-come, first served basis. See ROBERT
W. ADLER, ROBIN K. CRAIG & NOAH D. HALL, MODERN WATER LAW: PRIVATE PROPERTY,
PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS 87–89 (2013).
267. Id. at 23–76.
268. Id. at 23.
269. See Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, 15 N.W. 167, 168 (Minn. 1883).
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sonable use doctrine generally allows water to be transported and
used on nonriparian lands, such uses may be disfavored over uses
on riparian land.270
The Restatement (Second) of Torts reflects the common law of the
Great Lakes states with regard to reasonable use determinations.271
In balancing competing riparian rights, courts should look to the fol-
lowing factors:
(a) The purpose of the use,
(b) the suitability of the use to the watercourse or lake,
(c) the economic value of the use,
(d) the social value of the use,
(e) the extent and amount of the harm it causes,
(f) the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use or
method of use of one proprietor or the other,
(g) the practicality of adjusting the quantity of water used by each
proprietor,
(h) the protection of existing values of water uses, land, investments
and enterprises, and
(i) the justice of requiring the user causing harm to bear the loss.272
Thus, private water rights in the Great Lakes states are correlative
with respect to other riparians and subject to external conditions and a
court’s application of social and economic values.  While water use
rights benefit from the same constitutional protections that apply to
other forms of private property susceptible to governmental takings
(as discussed in the following subpart), private water rights are also
subject to the federal navigation servitude and the public trust doc-
trine.  These doctrines, discussed below, limit property rights by giving
the government the authority (and sometimes duty) to enforce public
rights at the expense of private property.
A. Protection from Takings
The Constitution grants the government power but also limits the
power of government with respect to individual rights; most notable
for environmental law is the limitation on the taking of private prop-
erty without due process and compensation.  The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution prohibit the taking of private prop-
270. Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am. Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174,
194–95 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.4, at 422–25 (3d ed., 2000)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007).
271. See id. at 203 n.46.
272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979).  While the Restatement factors are
provided for riparian law regarding surface waters, the same general correlative rights described
above and balancing of Restatement factors applies to groundwater. See Mich. Citizens for Water
Conservation, 709 N.W.2d at 204–06.
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erty for public use without compensation by the federal and state or
local governments.
The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”273
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states that “[n]o State shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”274
While the Fourteenth Amendment lacks the text regarding the tak-
ing of property, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amend-
ment’s takings prohibition applies to state and local governments
through the Due Process Clause.275  The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments only prohibit governments from taking private property
without just compensation and without due process of law.  Federal
and state governments can still involuntarily take private property
through eminent domain (providing due process and just compensa-
tion) as long as the taking serves a “public use”—a term broadly inter-
preted by the Supreme Court.276
The Supreme Court recognizes three categories of takings subject to
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  First, the government can
take private property by physically occupying the property or forcing
the private landowner to endure some physical invasion by the gov-
ernment or by the general public.  This is a classic condemnation using
eminent domain powers.  The Supreme Court considers any physical
taking as compensable, even when just a portion of a person’s prop-
erty has been occupied.277  Even the temporary flooding of private
property by the federal government may be compensable as a physical
taking, although the ultimate success of such a takings claim would
273. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
274. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
275. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1994); see also Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481 n.10 (1987).
276. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (“[W]hen this Court began
applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the
broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’”).
277. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
322 (2002) (“When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for
some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner, regardless of
whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.” (citations
omitted)); cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“The
historical rule that a permanent physical occupation of another’s property is a taking has more
than tradition to commend it.  Such an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of inva-
sion of an owner’s property interests.”).
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require a detailed inquiry into the nature of the property right under
relevant state law.278
Second, since 1922, the Supreme Court has recognized takings
claims for losses of private property rights due to federal and state
regulations that limit use of the property.  In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote for the Court, “while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking.”279  The protection against regula-
tions that go “too far” led to the Supreme Court’s three-part balanc-
ing test established in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.280  Under the Penn Central test, courts examine: (1) “[t]he eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” (2) “the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations,” and (3) “the character of the governmental action.”281
Given the factors of the balancing test, private persons have an uphill
battle to get compensation for regulations affecting private property
under the Penn Central analysis, but the doctrine nonetheless deters
government regulation and action.
Finally, since 1992, the Supreme Court has recognized a narrowly
defined categorical regulatory taking when government action de-
prives the landowner of all economic use of the land.  In Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court held that these
categorical regulatory takings automatically require compensation to
the private property owner.282  However, the regulation must produce
a complete wipeout of “all” economic use of the property; if the land-
owner retains some use of the property (no matter how small), the
278. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).  The Court’s
unanimous decision in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission allows a landowner to proceed with
a takings claim for compensation from temporary flooding caused by the federal government’s
operation of a dam.  However, allowing a landowner’s takings claim for temporary flooding to
proceed as a matter of federal takings law is not the end of the case.  The more difficult and
fundamental issue is whether, as a matter of state property law, ownership of riparian land in
Arkansas comes with some expectation of temporary flooding.  Justice Ginsburg wrote: “The
determination whether a taking has occurred includes consideration of the property owner’s
distinct investment-backed expectations, a matter often informed by the law in force in the State
in which the property is located.” Id. at 522 (citing Brief for Professors of Law Teaching in the
Property Law and Water Rights Fields as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Ark. Game &
Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 511 (No. 11-597)). See generally David Baake, Case Comment, Arkan-
sas Game and Fish Commission v. United States, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 577 (2013).
279. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
280. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
281. Id. at 124.
282. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017–19, 1029, 1031–32 (1992).
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Supreme Court uses the Penn Central balancing test instead of the
Lucas categorical rule.283
Applying the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence to water use
rights can be challenging.  Water rights, even when physically taken by
the government, are much more difficult to value than tangible prop-
erty that you can view on a surveyor’s map or hold in your hand.  This
is because water itself is constantly moving and the right to that water
is the right to its use, not its ownership.284  Nevertheless, the constitu-
tional protections against takings apply to private usufructuary water
rights and the government may not seize or diminish the value of
these rights without paying the owner compensation, just as it would
be forced to do if the taking involved tangible property.285  As de-
scribed above, the nature of riparian rights makes it difficult for pri-
vate parties to prevail in a takings claim.  In cases when courts do find
that the government has taken a water right, it is usually the case that
the entire right was destroyed; it is exceedingly uncommon for a plain-
tiff to win a takings case when the government has merely interfered
with the water right.286
B. Federal Navigation Servitude
The federal government also has a unique doctrinal defense to tak-
ings claims involving interference with riparian rights.  The “federal
navigation servitude” limits riparian rights and allows the federal gov-
ernment to further its navigation interests at the expense of private
property without paying compensation.287  The federal navigation ser-
vitude comes from the federal government’s “dominant public interest
in navigation.”288  As discussed above, the federal government has
Commerce Clause regulatory authority over navigation and navigabil-
ity.  But the navigation servitude effectively insulates the federal gov-
ernment from otherwise legitimate takings claims where federal
283. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 n.19
(2002) (noting that Lucas created “a narrow exception to the rules governing regulatory takings
for the ‘extraordinary circumstance’ of a permanent deprivation of all beneficial use,” and that,
as a result, Lucas categorical takings are “relatively rare” (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017–18));
see also Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 237, at 797–98.
284. Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, Protecting the Public Trust and Human Rights in the Great
Lakes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1333, 1336–37; see also Kathryn M. Casey, Comment, Water in the
West: Vested Water Rights Merit Protection Under the Takings Clause, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 305, 307
(2003).
285. Casey, supra note 284, at 307.
286. Robin Kundis Craig, Defining Riparian Rights as “Property” Through Takings Litigation:
Is There a Property Right to Environmental Quality?, 42 ENVTL. L. 115, 125 (2012).
287. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 276 (1897).
288. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 507 (1945).
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projects or operation of federal regulatory authority in navigable wa-
ters impair private property rights in those waters.289  Thus, it is best
understood as a “navigation servitude” or “navigation easement” that
encumbers private riparian rights.290 Similarly, both the states and
federal government can in some cases use the public trust doctrine
(discussed below) to justify regulation and avoid compensation pursu-
ant to takings jurisprudence.
C. Public Trust Doctrine
The concept of the public trust is ancient and dates back to the time
of Justinian and the Roman Empire, but its American application
stems from more recent English common law roots.291  The Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 established the public trust doctrine in the Great
Lakes and connecting waters.292  It provided that
[t]he navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence,
and the carrying places between the same, shall be common high-
ways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territory
as to the citizens of the United States, and those of any other States
that may be admitted into the confederacy, without any tax, impost,
or duty therefor.293
The public trust is essentially a recognition that navigable waters
are extremely important to society and that these waters should, in
some respects, be held open to the public for certain uses.294  Private
ownership is nonetheless protected and individual land owners are
permitted to transfer legal title to the lands under navigable waters,
but the state is to retain and protect the public’s interest in public trust
lands.295
The powers and limitations of states with respect to their Great
Lakes public trust resources were first addressed by the Supreme
289. See United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224–25 (1956).
290. See United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960); see also United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 61–63 (1913) (describing private title
to the beds of navigable waters as a “technical title,” which is “qualified” and “subordinate to
the public rights of navigation, and however helpful in protecting the owner against the right of
third parties, is of no avail against the exercise of the great and absolute power of Congress over
the improvement of navigable rivers”).
291. See Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and Sub-
merged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 918–20 (2007). See
generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
292. Frey & Mutz, supra note 291, at 921.
293. Northwest Ordinance of 1787 art. IV, reprinted in 1 U.S.C., at LV, LIX (2006).
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Court in the seminal case Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.296  The
case arose out of a conflict over control of the lakebed of Lake Michi-
gan near downtown Chicago.297  Through the Lake Front Act of 1869,
the State of Illinois had granted to the Illinois Central Railroad a large
portion of the lakebed under the Chicago Harbor.298  Today, almost
all commentators on this subject see this grant of submerged lands as
a blatant attempt by powerful corporate interests to seize land and
wealth at the expense of the public.299  Eventually, the Illinois state
legislature saw fit to revoke this grant of public land to a rich, private
company—an action that ultimately catalyzed the litigation.300  The
railroad challenged the revocation as a violation of its contracts and
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.301  The case wended its ways through the judicial system until
it reached the Supreme Court in 1892.
The Supreme Court ultimately held that submerged and coastal
lands held in the public trust by the state could be alienated, but the
state has a limited ability to divest this submerged public trust prop-
erty.302  The Court ruled that when Illinois conveyed ownership of the
submerged land to the railroad in 1869, it violated its duty to maintain
the public trust, as the conveyance lacked sufficient public purpose
and decision making.303
Thus, after Illinois Central Railroad, states are limited in their abil-
ity to alienate public trust land for private purposes related to naviga-
tion and commerce.  Divestments of portions of the public trust to
private purposes must not interfere with the traditional public inter-
ests of navigation, commerce, and fishing.304  Due to the immensity of
public trust land in the Great Lakes, this case was a crucial clarifica-
tion on the scope of states’ public trust responsibilities.
Although the federal and English characterizations of navigability
were important for the initial concept of the public trust in the new
Northwest Territory states, those states were ultimately able to craft
their own approaches to navigability and the public trust.  Once the
296. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
297. See id. at 390; see also Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the
American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
799, 800 (2004).
298. See James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 54–55 (2007).
299. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 297, at 805.
300. See Huffman, supra note 298, at 54–55.
301. See id. at 55.
302. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435.
303. See id. at 455–56.
304. See id.; see also Huffman, supra note 298, at 57.
768 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:723
new Northwest and Great Lakes states acquired sovereignty over
their territory upon being admitted to the Union, they were able to
craft more robust state versions of the public trust that encompassed
the Great Lakes.305  Consequently, the Great Lakes states today all
have varying and, in many cases, expansive public trust and navigabil-
ity doctrines that continue to define and protect the public’s interest in
the waters of the Great Lakes.
This multiplicity of Great Lakes public trust doctrines is important,
if only because of the vast amount of shoreline that the doctrine gov-
erns.  Throughout the United States, approximately 200,000 square
miles are affected by some form of public trust—and a third of that is
made up of Great Lakes state shorelines.306  However, it is important
to note that the Great Lakes do not contain a singular, monolithic
version of the doctrine.  Each state differs: some states have codified
the doctrine and others have left it to the common law.307
For example, in many Great Lakes states, navigability is defined by
“floatability”—in other words, a waterway is considered navigable for
purposes of the public trust doctrine if there is enough water to float a
boat, barge, or log down it.308  Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota all
employ this test in some fashion for determining the extent of the
public trust.309  The Supreme Court of Indiana has stated that naviga-
bility depends on whether the waterway was susceptible to navigation
at the time Indiana was admitted to the Union.310  Similarly evidenc-
ing the disparity between public trusts in Great Lakes states, Minne-
sota classifies navigability based on whether the surface water is
owned publicly or privately, whereas Illinois holds all meandered
lakes in the public trust, regardless of location, size, or shape.311  Be-
cause the public trust doctrine has its origins in navigability, the states
have generally rejected attempts to expand the doctrine to cover
groundwater.312
305. Frey & Mutz, supra note 291, at 923.
306. Id.
307. See id. at 924.
308. See id. at 926.
309. Id.
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312. See Noah D. Hall, Protecting Freshwater Resources in the Era of Global Water Markets:
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VI. CONCLUSION
Great Lakes law and governance is not static, nor should it be.  New
problems emerge, information improves, and values evolve over time.
However, the fundamental structure for governing the Great Lakes is
likely to remain constant.  Given the international and interstate na-
ture of the Great Lakes, the federal government has a supreme role in
governance based on its powers to enter treaties with foreign govern-
ments and regulate commerce between states.  While the federal gov-
ernment has the constitutional authority to take an even more
dominant role in Great Lakes governance, it has historically governed
in partnership with the states.  And the federal government’s power is
far from absolute.  State sovereignty, interstate governance, and In-
dian tribes continue to shape Great Lakes law and policy, while pri-
vate property rights steer local water use decisions.  Rather than
searching for a “governance solution” for the Great Lakes, we should
utilize and embrace all available powers and authorities as issues and
problems warrant.
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